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THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
DOCTRINE: AN ANCHOR HOLDING AMERICA
BACK IN THE MODERN AND EVOLVING
HEALTHCARE MARKETPLACE

I.

INTRODUCTION

Education and training matter when it comes to who provides
healthcare. In the United States, state law limits the practice of
medicine to licensed individuals who have completed a certain level of
education, training, and testing. However, what people may not be
aware of is the relationship between corporations and the provision of
care, cost, efficiency, innovation, and the entire healthcare delivery
system. The corporate practice of medicine doctrine has evolved
across the United States since the early twentieth century through restrictions imposed by state law. 1 The doctrine was created in an effort
by the American Medical Association (the "AMA") to professionalize medicine and prevent the dishonest practice of medicine and commercial exploitation of physicians through an ethical code.2 Although
the doctrine cannot be traced to a single point of legal origin, it has
emerged through a combination of Medical Practice Acts and public
policy arguments adopted by several courts and attorney general opinions. 3 Proponents for the corporate practice of medicine doctrine assert that anyone who provides medical care must be licensed by the
government and unlicensed persons or entities cannot entangle themselves in the practice of medicine. 4 These principles have been extended not only to impact the delivery of healthcare itself, but also the
business and financial aspects of it. Unfortunately, the doctrine is
often manifested in a largely incoherent and unpredictable array of
state-based laws, legal precedents, and expert opinions, creating a
204 (1982).
3 (2007).
3. See Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 664 N.E.2d 337, 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)
(recognizing public policy concerns pertinent to the corporate practice of medicine such as nonphysician control and divided loyalties); 1992 Op. Va. Att'y Gen., 1, 147 (1992) (concluding that
Virginia statutes and court decisions allow a hospital to employ a physician as a full-time employee as long as the employment agreement authorizes the physician to exercise control over
the diagnosis and treatment of the patient, the physician's judgment is not improperly influenced
by commercial or lay concerns, and the physician-patient relationship is not altered).
4. MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 1336 (9th ed. 2018).
1. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE

2. See ALLEGRA

KIM,
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shaky framework that judges continue to disparately enforce in a varied manner. 5
In short, the corporate practice of medicine prohibits or limits the
ability of corporations to offer or control healthcare services unless
the entity is solely comprised of physicians licensed by the state. 6 This
is based off the idea that: (1) allowing corporations to be entangled in
the practice of medicine will result in commercialization of health
care, (2) corporate goals may not align with optimum patient care, and
(3) the independent judgement of physicians must be preserved.7
The justification behind barring corporate influence from medical
practice overlooks the realities of the current healthcare marketplace.
Due to several exceptions to the doctrine,8 the justification for its survival is eroding. For example, instead of furthering the doctrine's
stated purpose of protecting physician autonomy in clinical decision
making, Health Maintenance Organizations and managed care9 have
generally made this goal moot, thereby preventing the formation of an
integrated healthcare system.' 0
Furthermore, in the current healthcare climate, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine inhibits medical innovation, impedes healthcare improvements in quality and efficiency, as well as prevents the
lowering of healthcare costs. Additionally, the doctrine complicates
the provision of healthcare across state lines because of how state law
and enforcement practices vary dramatically,1' which makes interstate
business integration difficult and legally hazardous. In particular, this

creates an issue with the deployment of medical services and re-

5. Infra Part II.A.
6. Michael F. Schaff & Glenn P. Prives, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: Still
Alive and Kicking (reproduced from BNA's HI:Ai:ru L. Rr'P., 20 HLR 1502 (Oct. 6, 2011)).
7. Id.
8. See infra Part II.B.ii.
9. Managed care plans are health insurance plans with the goal of managing cost, utilization,
and quality where health care providers contract with medical facilities to provide care for members at reduced costs. Plans that restrict your choices usually cost you less. Health Maintenance
Organizations ("HMOs") are a common type of managed care plan which limits coverage to
care from doctors who contract with the HMO. This plan typically does not cover care from
physicians who are out of network. This Article explains managed care and HMOs in further
detail in the Background Section. See Managed Care, MIHD.INI:PLUs, https://medlineplus.gov/
managedcare.html (last updated Sep. 20, 2018); see generally Stanley S. Wallack, Managed care:
Practice, pitfalls, and potential, HJEALTU

CARE FIN. Riev. (1992).

10. See Lloyd I. Sederer & Steven M. Mirin, The Impact of Managed Care on Clinical Practice,
65 PSYCIATRIC Q., 177, 180 (1994).
11. See generally Mary H. Michal et al., Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine 50 State Survey Summary, CTR. ADVANCE PALLIATIVE CARE (2006).

2020]CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE DOCTRINE 159
sources, most notably via telemedicine, necessary to prevent the

spread of COVID-19.12
Part II of this Comment begins by providing an overview of the
history and mechanics of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
and concludes with a discussion of the current state of the doctrine in
the modern healthcare environment. Part III covers various rationales13 as to how the contemporary healthcare environment and exceptions to the prohibition on corporations practicing medicine derail
the public policy arguments in support of the ban and render it obsolete. Part IV covers a set a of potential responses from the healthcare
industry if states were to allow corporate practice of medicine, which
would ultimately lead to increased medical innovation, efficiency, and
a lower cost of care.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Corporate Practice of Medicine History and Explanation

The corporate practice of medicine doctrine is a common law doctrine that prohibits corporations from practicing medicine or employing a physician to provide professional medical services. 14 This
doctrine also recognizes that it is impossible for a corporation to perform medical actions or be licensed to practice medicine.' 5 Therefore,
only licensed physicians may own an interest in a medical practice. 16
This doctrine arises from state medical practice acts and reflects a
number of public policy concerns, such as: (1) to allow corporations to
practice medicine or employ physicians will result in the commerciali12. The coronavirus disease of 2019 is a novel, contagious respiratory virus first identified
December 2019 in wuhan, China. Viruses and the diseases they cause usually have separate
names. The world Health Organization ("WHO") officially names diseases while the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses ("ICTV") names viruses. WHO officially named the
disease caused by the virus "COVID-19" and refers to virus as the "COVID-19 virus." ICTV
named the virus severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 or "SARS-CoV-2." Naming
the coronavirusdisease (COVID-19) and the virus that causes it, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://
www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-thecoronavirus-disease-(covid-2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it (last visited Nov. 15, 2020); Bill
Siwicki, Telemedicine during COVID-19: Benefits, limitations, burdens, adaptation, HEALTHCARE
IT NEWS (Mar. 19, 2020, 3:09 P.M.), https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/telemedicine-during-covid-19-benefits-limitations-burdens-adaptation.
13. Infra Part III.A, B.
14. Issue brief Corporate practice of medicine, AM. MED. Ass'N 1 (2015).
15. Estate of Harper ex rel. AI-Hamim v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., 140 P.3d 273, 275
(Colo. App. 2006).
16. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. § 1507 (McKinney 2012) (stating that equity interests in any New
York medical professional corporation may only be held by individuals who are licensed to practice medicine in New York and who participate in the subject practice. Any shares issued in
violation of the section are void.).
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zation of the practice of medicine, (2) a corporation's obligation to its
shareholders may not align with a physician's obligation to her patients, and (3) employment of a physician by a for-profit corporation
may interfere with the physician's independent medical judgment."
By and large, the restriction on corporate practice of medicine is established under the idea that a corporate entity cannot satisfy the licensure requirements mandated under state law required to practice
medicine. 18
The starting point for determining whether one violates the corporate practice of medicine doctrine is to examine a particular jurisdiction's Medical Practice Act,1 9 which enumerates the jurisdiction's
licensure requirements; the next step is to examine how the Act defines of "the practice of medicine." 20 For example, the Illinois Medical Practice Act mandates that "no person shall practice medicine ...
without a valid, existing license to do so."21 Additionally, in Illinois,
the "practice of medicine" is defined as engaging in the "diagnosis or
treatment of physical or mental ailments or conditions" as well as
"suggest[ing], recommend[ing] or prescrib[ing] any form of treatment
.... "22 Exemptions from licensure are statutorily driven, 2 3 however,
no exemption applies to corporate entities. Thus, by implication, because there is no express exemption, the Illinois Medical Practice Act
prohibits corporations from practicing medicine. 24

L. SHEPHERD, BIoviTICS AND THl LAW 500 (2d ed. 2009).
18. The term "corporate entity" in this article either refers to corporations, partnerships, or
limited liability companies. Stuart I. Silverman, In an Era of Healthcare Delivery Reforms, The
Corporate Practiceof Medicine is a Matter That Requires Vigilance, 9 HEALTH L. Por'y BRIIi 1,
4 (2015).
19. "[E]ach of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories has a medical
practice act that defines the practice of medicine and delegates the authority to enforce the law
to a state medical board. State medical boards license physicians, investigate complaints, discipline those who violate the law, conduct physician evaluations and facilitate rehabilitation of
physicians where appropriate." Robert John Kane & Lawrence E. Singer, The Law of Medical
Practicein Illinois, Ill. Prac. Series (last updated Apr. 2020).
20. Some states directly define the practice of medicine in their Medical Practice Acts while
others may merely set out violations for holding oneself out as being engaged in the diagnosis
and treatment of aliments without a license, and/or provide a list of some conduct that constitutes the practice of medicine. E.g., 225 Im,. COMP. STAT. 60/49 (West 1992); 225 Iii. CoMI'.
STAT. 60/50 (West 1992); C.R.S.A. § 12-240-107 (2020).
17. JANET L. DOLGIN & Lois

21. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/3 (2014).
22. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/49 (1987).
23. See generally 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/4 (2011).
24. See generally id.
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The Roots and Connection of the Corporate Practice of Medicine
Doctrine with the American Medical Association

1.

The formation of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine can be
traced back to the practice of medicine in the nineteenth century. 25
The AMA, a group comprised of physicians with the purpose of advocating on their own behalf, was formed in 1847 and was the driving
force behind early licensure statutes. 26 In the nineteenth century, the
medical profession was characterized by its fierce competition for patients among both physicians and those who lacked traditional medical education. 27 In promoting the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine, the AMA sought to legitimize the medical profession, establish physicians as the sole source of professional healthcare services,
and otherwise control the healthcare market. 28 The newly-established
AMA adopted its code, which, in an attempt to distinguish physicians
from non-physicians attempting to practice, prohibited physicians
from engaging in entrepreneurial activities such as withholding
medicine from patients, promoting secret remedies, and advertising to
enhance their own reputations. 29
The AMA's initial success in regulating the medical profession
came with states adopting licensing requirements for physicians and
seeking medical education reform. 30 The first licensing statutes required only that those practicing medicine hold a diploma from a
medical college. 31 By the early twentieth century, however, the AMA
successfully pressured state licensing boards to adopt increasingly
stringent standards to obtain a medical license. 32 Despite the AMA's
control over the medical market, the corporate presence in the medical marketplace increased. 33 In turn, the AMA became concerned that
corporations were threatening physician autonomy, and consequently,
that physicians would lose their newly won control. 3 4
25. See AMA History, AM. MED. Ass'N, https://www.ama-assn.org/about/ama-history/amahistory (last updated Nov. 20, 2018).
26. Id.
27. DONALD E. KONOLD, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ETHICs 1847-1912 16 (1962);
see generally CARLETON B. CHAPMAN, PHYSICIANS, LAw, AND ETHICs

(1984).

28. Michele Gustavson & Nick Taylor, At Death's Door-Idaho's Corporate Practice of
Medicine Doctrine, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 479, 480-81 (2011).
29. See KONOLD, supra note 27.
30. See STARR, supra note 1, at 94.

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 102.
Id. at 118.
Id.
Id.
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Forms of Corporate Involvement in the Practice of Medicine

Corporate involvement in the practice of medicine developed in
two forms.3 5 In the first form, known as "contract practice," physicians
were employed by corporate entities to provide medical services to
the corporate entity's employees. 36 In consideration for medical services, either a prearranged salary or a monthly rate per-patient was
paid to the contracting physician. 37 In the second form, known as
"corporate practice," physician services were marketed to the public
by corporate entities that either directly employed the physicians or
hired them as independent contractors. 38 While these corporate entities were originally founded by physicians, non-physicians slowly began to control the management over time. 39 In more extreme cases,
this control included non-physicians dictating the length of hospital
stays and refusing to pay fees beyond an amount they considered to

be excessive. 40
Corporate involvement in medicine through contract and corporate
practice alarmed the leaders of the medical profession who maintained that such involvement would necessitate high patient loads for
physicians, resulting in a lower quality of care. 4 1 However, critics asserted that contract and corporate practice created competition between physicians, forcing them to bid against each other for contracts
with corporate entities to provide medical services, allowing room for
lay person control. 42 These critics claimed that "increased competition
and lay control over the patients physicians could see and the services
physicians could provide limited the monopoly the profession had created with regard to medical services." 43
In 1890, the AMA criticized the corporate practice of medicine and
stated that the corporate involvement in medical care had brought too
much trade into the profession. 44 The AMA urged physicians to resist
any further expansion of corporate practice. 45 In 1912, the AMA read35. Comment, Adam M. Freiman, The Abandonment of the Antiquated Corporate Practiceof
Medicine Doctrine: Injecting a Dose of Efficiency into the Modern Health Care Environment, 47
EMORY L.J. 697, 701 (1998).
36. Id.
37. Gustavson & Taylor, supra note 28, at 490.
38. Freiman, supra note 35, at 701.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Note, Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, The CorporatePractice of Medicine Doctrine:An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. Rr:v. 445, 457 (1987).
42. Id. at 457-58.
43. Freiman, supra note 35, at 702.
44. In re AMA, 94 F.T.C. 701, 898 (1979) (quoting internal AMA report).
45. Id.
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dressed the issue of corporate practice by revising its ethics code to
condemn any contract that interfered with adequate medical care or
reasonable competition among physicians.4 6 Despite this condemnation, the corporate practice continued to expand.4 7 In 1934, the AMA
revised the ethical provision condemning this practice by explicitly defining "contract practice" as an "agreement between a physician
group or group of physicians ... and a corporation, organization, political subdivision or individual to furnish partial or full medical services . . . on the basis of a fee schedule or for a salary or a fixed rate
per capita."4 8 The revised ethical provision stated that while contract
practice was not necessarily unethical by itself, each contract was to be
considered separately based on the existence of certain enumerated
conditions or features.49
Additionally, the AMA added a provision to its ethical code condemning contractual relationships in which non-physicians directly
profited from the provision of medical services by physicians. 50 The
AMA concluded that such an arrangement is "beneath the dignity of
professional practice, is unfair competition with the profession at
large, is harmful alike to the profession of medicine and the welfare of
the people, and is against sound public policy." 51 These provisions endured as a part of the AMA's code, eventually combining both contract and corporate practice under the umbrella of the "corporate
practice of medicine." 5 2
B.

Overview of State Laws

The corporate practice of medicine doctrine has transformed over
the years by state statutes, regulations, court decisions, attorney general opinions, and actions by state medical licensing boards. 53 Many
states today still rely on cases and attorney general opinions dating
back to the 1950s as primary authority if they do not address the doctrine in a statute or regulation. 54 While most states prohibit the corporate practice of medicine, every state provides an exception for
46. Joseph Laufer, Ethical and Legal Restrictions on Contract and Corporate Practice of
Medicine, 6 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 516, 518 (1939) (quoting PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS
1912).
47. Id. at 519.
48. See id. (quoting 1934 AMENDMENTS TO PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETI1Cs).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Contract Practice, 57 J. AM. MED. ASs'N 145, 146 (1911).
53. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 14.
54. See Georgina Wiggins, Corporate Practice of Medicine: 50 State Survey, AM. HEALTH L.
Ass'N (July 18, 2017), https://silo.tips/download/corporate-practice-of-medicine-50-state-survey.
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professional corporations and many states provide an exception for
employment of physicians by certain corporate entities. 55 The scope of
the prohibitions, as well as the exceptions, vary.56
1.

Scope of Prohibition:Strong versus Weak

State law prohibitions against the corporate practice of medicine
vary based on strong and weak forms of enforcement of the doctrine. 57 States employing strong forms actively enforce the prohibition
on the corporate practice of medicine. 58 In contrast, states employing
weak forms often allow some corporate interference within the medical arena so long as laypersons cannot interfere with the medical judgment of physicians. 59 Additionally, states that lack either a strong or
weak form have either explicitly rejected the existence of the prohibition, or do not have binding authorities. 60
2.

Strong Form of Prohibition

States with a strong form prohibition on the corporate practice of
medicine will likely find a violation when a corporate entity, other
than a professional medical corporation, hires physicians. 6 1 In the
strong form, a per se violation typically occurs when physicians are
hired by corporate entities to provide medical services, regardless of
whether physicians are hired as employees or independent contractors. 62 Because of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, nonphysicians, lay corporations, 63 and limited liability companies may not
contract to provide medical services.64
55. AMERICAN MEDICAL AssocIATION, supra note 14.
56. Id.
57. Will CorporatePracticeof Medicine Kill Your Healthcare Venture?, COIN HijArLI CAlRE
L. GROUP, https://cohenhealthcarelaw.com/2019/08/will-corporate-practice-of-medicine-killyour-healthcareventure/#:-:text=states%20with %20a%20% E2%80%9Cweak % E2%80%9
D%20Corporate,interfere%20with%20clinical%20decision%2Dmaking (last visited Aug. 28,
2020).
58. Freiman, supra note 35, at 713.
59. COHEN H EAL:IICARE LAw GRouP,, supra note 57.
60. wiggins, supra note 54 (outlining states with or without existing corporate practice of
medicine doctrine).
61. Id.
62. Id. This is the case for California. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDe § 2400 (1980). See also People
v. Cole, 135 P.3d 669, 671 (Cal. 2006) (reaffirming the state's long-standing prohibition against
corporate practice).
63. Lay corporations are those that are not medical professional corporations.
64. CAl.. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2052 (2011); CAL. Bus. & PROP. CODE § 2400 (1980). Thus,
non-physicians in California are prohibited from owning medical clinics or hiring physicians.
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Another characteristic of the strong form is prescribing the use of
specific corporate medical legal structures. 65 Every state allows for the
creation of professional corporations, which are corporations organized for the specific purpose of rendering a professional service. 6 6
State statutes often specify how the professional corporations are to
be structured, who can participate as shareholders, and who must
serve on the professional corporation's board of directors. 67 Most
states restrict the professional corporation from having shareholders,

owners, or directors who are not persons licensed to render the same
professional service as the professional corporation. 68 For example,
the Arkansas Medical Practice Act provides that "[a]ll of the officers,
directors, and shareholders . . . shall at all times be the persons li69
Other
censed pursuant to the Arkansas Medical Practice Act."
states, however, permit a professional corporation to have non-physician owners or shareholders, usually provided that such ownership is
limited to a minority percent. 70 Further, some states even allow for the
creation of multi-service corporations, organized by physicians and
other healthcare providers, including dentists, registered nurses,
71
podiatrists, optometrists, physicians' assistants, and the like.
Weak Form of Prohibition

3.

On the other hand, states with a weak prohibition on the corporate
practice of medicine sometimes allow corporate entities to hire physicians to provide medical services, so long as the employment contract
clarifies that the corporate entity cannot interfere with clinical decision-making. 72 Medical licensure boards have additionally influenced
the corporate practice of medicine doctrine through the filing of opinions. 73 Many of these opinions analyze whether the physician maintains her independent judgement and determine whether the
corporate practice of medicine ban has been violated through the employment of physicians. 74 For example, Virginia is more permissive
with respect to the corporate practice of medicine. 75 In particular, the
Office of the Virginia Attorney General has taken the position that:
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

73.
74.
75.

See generally
Id.
Id.
Id.

AMERICAN

MEDICAL

ASSOCIATION,

supra note 14.

§ 4-29-307(a) (2017).
See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 12-240-138(1)(d)(II).
See R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-5.1-3(b)(1) (2013).
COHEN HEALTHCARE LAw GROUP, supra note 57.
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 14.
Id.
1992 Op. Va. Att'y Gen., 1, 147 (1992).
ARK. CODE ANN.
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The Virginia statutes and court decisions allow a hospital to employ
a physician as long as the employment agreement authorizes the
physician to exercise control over the diagnosis and treatment of the
patient, the physician's professional judgment is not improperly influenced by commercial or lay (nonphysician) concerns, and the
physician-patient relationship is not altered. 76

While there is often a corporate practice of medicine exception for
hospitals that hire physicians, the above statement from the Virginia
Attorney General explains the logic behind the weak form of the
doctrine. 77
Further, in a declaratory ruling, Alabama's Medical Licensure
Commission and its Board of Medical Examiners found that employment of physicians by a clinic did not constitute corporate practice of
medicine because the employment agreement specifically gave physicians exclusive autonomy to make all decisions concerning the medical services that they provide to patients. 78 Similarly, in one of its
Statements of Position, 79 the Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners
found that "a physician's employment by a business corporation does
not per se violate the Medical Practice Act." 80 It further concluded
that:

'

[T]he essence of the practice of medicine is the exercise of independent medical judgment in the diagnosing, treating, curing or relieving of any bodily or mental disease, condition, infirmity, deformity,
defect, ailment, or injury in any human being . . .. If a corporate
employer seeks to impose or substitute its judgment for that of the
physician in any of these functions, or the employment is otherwise
structured so as to undermine the essential incidents of the physician patient relationship, the Medical Practice Act will have been
violated. 8

The AMA, having articulated their public policy concerns regarding
states' corporate practice of medicine, and having convinced states to
expansively interpret their state Medical Practice Acts, successfully in76. Id.
77. COHEN HEATIICARE LAw GROUP, supra note 57.
78. Declaratory Ruling, ALA. MED. LICENSURE COMM'N & Bo. Min. ExAM'R (Oct. 21,

1992).
79. Statements of position by medical boards are "interpretive statements that attempt to define or explain the meaning of laws or rules that govern the practice of physicians ... " What are
the position statements of the Board and to whom do they apply?, N.C. MED. Bo. (Nov. 1999),
https://www.ncmedboard.org/resources-information/professional-resources/laws-rules-positionstatements/position-statements/
whatare_thepositionstatements_of_the_board_and_to_whom_do_theyapply.
80. Statement of Position: Employment of Physician By Corporation Other Than A Professional Medical Corporation, LA. Bo. Miao. ExAM'R (Sept. 24, 1992, reviewed Mar. 21, 2001).
81. Id.
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doctrinated a state-law based prohibition on the corporate practice of
medicine. 82
C.

Exceptions to the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine8 3

While there are many inconsistencies of the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine throughout the states, there are many shared exceptions.84 In particular, several states provide an exception allowing
physicians to be employed by certain corporate entities. 85 This exception varies by state, with some states allowing nonprofit hospitals to
employ physicians, some permitting nonprofit or for profit hospitals to
employ physicians, and others allowing corporate entities that are exclusively physician owned. 86
Many states that allow hospitals to employ physicians specifically
prohibit the hospital from interfering with the independent medical
judgment of the physician, thereby protecting the autonomy of the
physician's clinical decision-making. 87 For example, in Illinois, a physician may be employed by a hospital or a hospital's affiliate if the physician and employing entity "sign a statement acknowledging that the
employer shall not unreasonably exercise control, direct, or interfere
with the employed physician's exercise and execution of his or her
professional judgment in a manner that adversely affect the employed
physician's ability to provide quality care to patients." 88 "Professional
judgment" is defined as "the exercise of a physician's independent
clinical judgment in providing medically appropriate diagnosis, care,
89
and treatment to a particular patient at a particular time."

82. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 14.

83. while there are more exceptions to the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, this
Article will focus on the nonprofit and managed care exceptions.
84. See Freiman, supra note 35, at 706.
85. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 14.
86. See TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 311.062 (west 2011); St. Francis Reg'l Med.
Ctr., Inc. v. weiss, 254 Kan. 728, 733 (1994) (holding that a licensed hospital, whether nonprofit
or for profit may enter into an employment contract for the services of a physician); William M.
Sage & Kelley McIlhattan, Upstream Health Law, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 535, 542 (2014)
("Many states allow exceptions, such as physician employment by hospitals or corporate practice
by an entity that is entirely physician-owned...").
87. Elizabeth A. Snelson, Physician Employment and Alternative PracticeStrategies:Avoiding
"Company Doctor" Syndrome & Other Hospital Medical Staff Issues, 21 HEALTH LAw. 14, 14
(2008).
88. 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/10.8(a)(3) (2011).
89. Id.
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Nonprofits

Some states, such as California and Texas, do not apply the corporate practice of medicine doctrine to nonprofit corporations. 90 This exception may cover fraternal, religious, hospital, labor, education, and
similar organizations. 9 1 With this exception, the corporation's administrative matters can be handled by non-physician officers, while the
corporation's medical decisions and policies must be made by the physicians. 92 Proponents for this exception have argued that the lack of
profit motivation lessens the public policy concerns that give rise to
the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. 93 In the absence of a
profit motive, commercialization or the physician's division of loyalty
between the patient's best interest and corporate profit is unlikely to
exist. 94 This exception is premised on the notion that these entities are
statutory creations intended for the public welfare and are regulated
by the government, thus carrying the same mission as the Board 95 in
protecting the well-being of citizens. 96
2.

Managed Care and Health Maintenance Organizations

The proliferation of managed care 97 led to the emphasis put on
growing HMOs to combat increasing healthcare costs in the 1970s,
which resulted in states allowing HMOs to employ physicians to practice medicine. 98 Amid the soaring costs of healthcare, American employers recognized the need to precipitate changes in the delivery of
healthcare, the costs of which, by the 1980s, were the employers' largest non-payroll costs. 99 Employers attempted to control healthcare expenditures by entering into price control agreements with physicians
under which the employers would negotiate a fixed per employee payment to providers, thereby shifting the risk of excessive consumption
90. See Cal. Physicians' Serv. v. Garrison, 172 P.2d 4, 11-12 (Cal. 1946) (holding that nonprofit corporations employing physicians to practice medicine does not violate the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine).
91. See Wiggins, supra note 54.
92. Tex. Occ. Cooc ANN. § 162.001(b) (West 2007).
93. See People v. Pac. Health Corp., 82 P.2d 429, 431 (Cal. 1938) (holding policy under corporate practice ban is inapplicable to nonprofit organizations because "the principal evils attendant
upon corporate practice of medicine spring from conflict between the professional standards and
obligations of the doctors and the profit motive of the corporate employer").
94. See generally Robert M. Veatch, Ethical Dilemmas of For-ProfitEnterprise in Health Care,
Ncw HEALTHI CARE FOR PRoFrr (1983).
95. The "Board" refers to the statutorily created Medical Board of a state.
96. Position Statement: Corporatepractice of medicine, N.C. MEo. Bo. (Mar. 2016).
97. Supra note 9.
98. See Melville H. Hodge, Health Care and America's Rolling Depression, 21 HEA.TI1 CARE
MGMT. REv. 7, 7-12 (1996).
99. Id.
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of medical services to the providers themselves. 100 These contractual
arrangements were the foundation for today's managed care
system.1 01
Managed care is represented by three different forms. 102 HMOs are
one of the three types of managed care plans and provide coverage
through a network of physicians and other health care providers who
are under contract with the HMO. 10 3 These contracts allow for premiums to be lower compared to traditional health insurance-because
the healthcare providers have the advantage of patients being directed
to them-but they also impose additional restrictions on the HMOs
members.1 04 This provides for comprehensive health benefits to the
insured in exchange for fixed periodic payments.1 05 In short, the HMO
limits coverage to medical aid provided by physicians under contract
with the HMO and physicians' compensation is based on a set annual
rate, not on services performed.10
Many states have enacted legislation specifically allowing HMOs to
employ physicians in order to eliminate the corporate practice ban as
an obstacle to HMO growth. 107 Other states only allow HMOs to
enter into independent contract arrangements with partnerships, professional corporations, or groups of physicians to provide medical services to their insurers.' 08 The Affordable Care Act1 09 now requires all
citizens to carry some form of health insurance; many citizens subscribed to HMOs.110

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. The three forms of managed care are: (1) Health Maintenance Organizations, (2) Preferred Provider Organizations, and (3) Point of Service plans. See Robert B. Friedland, Managed
Care and All of Us: The Role of Managed Care in the Future, 20 J. AM. SOc'Y ON AGING 37
(1996).
103. Adam Hayes, Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), INVESTOPEDIA, https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hmo.asp (last updated July 5, 2020).
104. Id.
105. See John R. Kress & James Singer, HMO HANDBOOK 13 (1975); Arnold J. Rosoff, The
Federal HMO Assistance Act: Helping Hand or Hurdle?, 13 AM. Bus. L.J. 137, 138-39 (1975).
106. See Kress & Singer, supra note 105, at 15. For a sample contract between an HMO and a
medical provider see id. at 63-68.
107. See e.g., IND. CODE § 27-13-4-1(a)(3) (1997); VA. CODE. ANN. § 38.2-4303(A)(3) (1994).
108. Francis J. Serbaroli, Corporate Practice of Medicine: A Clear and Present Danger, 7
HEALTH LAw. 6, 7 (1994).
109. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
110. Bruce Japsen, Obamacare Troubles Trigger An HMO Comeback, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2016,
9:30 A.M.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2016/10/02/obamacare-troubles-trigger-anhmo-comeback/?sh=5072542557e3.
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The Modern Healthcare Environment and Current Status of the
Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine

The current status of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
among the states ranges from active enforcement, to the lack of enforcement of an existing state doctrine,' 1 ' to explicit rejection of a corporate practice ban,1 2 to ambiguity regarding the corporate practice
prohibition altogether.1 3 States with active enforcement of the corporate ban use various sources of law, from statutes and regulations to
outdated case law and attorney general opinions, in order to enforce
the corporate practice of medicine doctrine.1 4 While ethical restrictions no longer bar the corporate practice of medicine, legal prohibitions against such practice still exist in many states, although it is
marked with state-to-state inconsistency. 1 5
1.

The Management Service Organization Business Model

In order to comply with a state's corporate practice of medicine
laws, lay entities seeking a business relationship with a physician
group have found ways to operate around the restrictions. 16 Almost
all states permit physicians to practice medicine through partnerships,
professional corporations (PCs), or professional service limited liability companies (PLLCs) as long as they are comprised exclusively of
licensed physicians who share the profits." 7 In strong-form states,
such as California, New York, and Texas, many companies providing
medical care use the "friendly PC" Management Service Organization
("MSO") model to avoid a direct violation of the state's prohibition
on the corporate practice of medicine.1 18
Under the MSO model, a PC, PLLC, or other legal entity permitted
in the state-provided 100% of the shareholders (or members) are
111. wiggins, supra note 54. States with lack of enforcement from an existing state doctrine
include Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.
112. See Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106, 114 (I1. 1997) (finding that
the employment agreement between the hospital and physician was not unenforceable due to
the hospital's status as a corporate entity).
113. See Freiman, supra note 35, at 725.
114. wiggins, supra note 54.
115. Id.
116. KIM, supra note 2, at 34.
117. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRe. LAw § 1507 (McKinney 2012); N.Y. Li. LIAR. Co. LAw § 1207(b)
(McKinney 2016). See also Louis G. RUBINO ET AL., Niew LEADERSIiP FoR TODAY'S H:AI:ru
CARE PROIFSSIoNALS: CONCEPTS AND CASES 286 fig.14.1 (2d ed. 2018) (outlining medical prac-

tice structures).
118. Daniel Gottlieb, Corporate Practice of Medicine: The Unseen Hurdle in Telehealth,
HEALTH L. ADVISOR (Feb. 6, 2013), https://www.healthlawadvisor.com/2013/02/06/corporatepractice-of-medicine-the-unseen-hurdle-in-telehealth/.
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physicians-employs healthcare professionals and contracts with an
MSO11 9 to provide the administrative and management services for
the business in exchange for a fee. 12 0 The PC is kept "friendly"
through the use of a restrictive stock transfer agreement or by the
MSO employing the physician owner.121 Generally, the restrictive
stock transfer agreements prevent the shareholder from transferring
her shares without the consent of the MSO.1 22 These agreements usually require that the shareholder transfer the share in the PC to an
individual designated or approved by the MSO.1 23 The combination of
business management control and the threat of exercising its rights
under the transfer agreement allow the MSO to maintain control over
the administrative and management side of the entity without infringing on the professional judgement of the physicians.1 2 4 However,
while this model clears the initial hurdle of the corporate practice of
medicine by restricting non-physician ownership, management service
agreements1 25 must be carefully drafted to ensure the MSO does not
exercise too much control over the PC to become too deeply entrenched in the PC's affairs to contravene the underlying principles 2 6
of the doctrine.1 2 7
2.

The Rise of Telemedicine

The emergence of technology solutions in the modern healthcare
environment has not only led to innovation in procedures and treat119. "A Management Service Organization is a business (commonly for profit) that provides
non-clinical services to providers," particularly administrative services including billing and coding, information technology, compliance, credentialing, financial services and group purchasing.
Gregory D. Anderson & Emily B. Grey, The MSO's PrognosisAfter the ACA: A Viable Integration Tool?, PHYSICIANS & PHYSICIAN ORG. L. INST. 1, 2 (2013).
120. Health Care Regulatory Primer: Management Service Organizations, CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.chapman.com/insights-publications-HealthCareManage
ment_ServiceOrganizations.html.
121. Id.
122. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201451009 (Dec. 19, 2014).
123. Id.
124. Id.; CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, supra note 120.
125. Contracts between the physician practices (PC, PLLC, etc.) and the MSO.
126. The focus in any regulatory investigation, in this case, likely would focus on the MSO
interfering with the physicians' independent medical judgment and the control it exercises on the
medical practice. See Carothers v. Progressive Ins. Co., 128 N.E.3d 153, 162 (2019) (finding that a
medical professional corporation ceding too much control of management activities, including
financing and operations, to a non-physician violates the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
making the entity improperly incorporated).
127. Douglas E. Goldstein, ALLIANCES: STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING INTEGRATED DELIVERY

SYSTEMS 246 (1995).
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ment of patients, but also in how healthcare is delivered. 128 In the

quest to lower the cost of healthcare in the United States and deliver
improved outcomes, one area of particular promise is telemedicine.1 2 9
Telemedicine connects patients with healthcare providers in remote
locations using telecommunication technology. 130 While telemedicine
has changed drastically from its inception, 13 1 the expansion of widespread access to live video communications via the internet has catapulted telemedicine to its prime.1 32 Telemedicine has changed the
modern healthcare environment in four crucial ways: (1) creating a
direct-to-consumer market for medicine, (2) establishing self-service
by patients, (3) enhancing provider collaboration, and (4) shifting the
spaces in which patients may be treated. 133
Although many providers have determined that many aspects of the
services they provide can be effective remotely via technology,
telehealth providers must comply with restrictions in each state they
wish to practice.1 34 It is critical that companies offering telehealth services comply with the restrictions imposed by the corporate practice
of medicine doctrine.1 35 For technology companies entering the
healthcare industry to provide telehealth services, this is particularly
problematic as many are unaware of the existence of the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine and that their corporate structure may
violate it.136
128. See generally Yasser El-Miedany, Telehealth and telemedicine: how the digital era is
changing the standard of health care, 4 SMART HOMECARE TrxC'i. & TE .E HEAI:rii 43, 47 (2017);
Shubham Singhal & Stephanie Carlton, The era of exponential improvement in healthcare?,

& Co. (2019).
129. Why Telehealth Is Critical to Health Care Transformation, AM. Hos. Ass'N, https://
www.aha.org/aha-center-health-innovation-market-scan/2019-02-26-why-telehealth-criticalhealth-care (last visited Feb 16, 2020).
130. Telemedicine Defined, AMD GLOBAl. TitLEMEDICINE, https://www.amdtelemedicine.
com/telemedicine-resources/telemedicine-defined.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
131. Telemedicine can be traced back centuries when medical care was limited to the radius of
available physicians, but it particularly gained traction with the introduction of the telephone.
From the 1960s onwards, telemedicine was characterized by many different types of systems and
relatively few have endured beyond five to seven years. Claudio Cipolat & Michael Geiges, The
History of Telemedicine, TEI.EMEDICINI: & T[LEI)ERMA TrAO);Y 6, 7 (2003).
132. The use of telehealth by hospitals fully or partially implementing computerized
telehealth systems has grown rapidly from 35% in 2010 to 76% in 2017. Fact Sheet: Telehealth,
AM. HosP. ASS'N (Feb. 2019), https://www.aha.org/factsheet/telehealth.
133. Mandy Roth, 4 Ways Telemedicine is Changing Healthcare, HEALTHLEADERS (Aug. 28,
2018), https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/innovation/4-ways-telemedicine-changinghealthcare.
134. Marcie M. Damisch, Telemedicine licensure and related challenges for physicians, 95
MED. ECON. 1, 1 (Apr. 10, 2018).
135. Id.
136. Id.
McKINSEY
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III.

ANALYSIS

The corporate practice of medicine doctrine is an obsolete doctrine.
The existence of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine is dependent upon sometimes-strained interpretations of public policy grounds
137
Today's
that led the AMA to pursue the doctrine many years ago.
modern healthcare delivery and corporate practice ban exceptions diminish the public policy grounds for the doctrine. Because the doctrine was judicially created based upon three main public policy
grounds,' 38 its continued existence should be dependent on the contin-

ued existence of those grounds.
The policies have already been strained with the contemporary
healthcare environment making this doctrine far too antiquated for
the United States. Despite the endless debate over the future direction of healthcare in the United States, this crucial problem has been
ignored; the market is hamstrung by the doctrine instead of allowing
free-market competition to improve the system. The prohibition on
the corporate practice of medicine threatens the development and efficiency of healthcare delivery systems and the advancement of
medicine, particularly telemedicine. By rejecting the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, the United States would see a lower cost of
care, increased efficiency, and greater medical innovation, which have
been sidelined because of this doctrine.
A.

The Contemporary Health Care Environment and Corporate
Influence

The delivery of healthcare has changed tremendously since the
AMA first articulated the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Periods of growth in national healthcare expenditures have resulted in
the surge of for-profit activity in healthcare.1 39 Thus, the industry has
evolved in recent years in an environment of price sensitivity and
growing competition. 140
137. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 14; STARR, supra note 1.
138. See Clower v. Orthalliance, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2004); see also
McMurdo v. Getter, 10 N.E.2d 139, 142 (Mass. 1937); State Electro-Med. Inst. v. Planter, 103
N.W. 1079 (1905). The aforementioned cases are examples of how the doctrine was created
judicially based on similar public policy grounds.
&

139. Bradford H. Gray, An Introductionto the New Health Carefor Profit, THE NEw HEALTH
8 (1983); see also National Health Expenditure Data, CTR. MEDICARE

CARE FOR PROFIT 1,

MEDICAID SERV., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trendsand-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData (last modified Dec. 17, 2019).
140. See Doug Gavel, Up and out: Price sensitivity in health care insurance market, HARV.
KENNEDY SCH. (May 4, 2017), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/research-insights/policy-topics/
health/price-sensitivity-health-care; see generally Bernd Montag, The Keys to Staying Competi-
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One result of this evolution is the expanded provision of medical
services by corporate entities.1 41 In their efforts to provide medical
services in a cost-conscious environment, corporate entities have introduced alternative systems of healthcare delivery1 4 2 that are inconsistent with traditional notions of professional autonomy and
contravene the underpinnings of the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine. More than half of the insurance products offered on public
exchanges under the Affordable Care Act are HMOs or other plans
that limit health care providers to a predetermined network. 14 3 While
HMOs generally limit an insured's choices to the physicians and
health systems within their network, this structure works to keep costs
low.1 44 Consequently, consumers have been choosing these health insurance plans in order to save money. 14 5 Since managed care changed
the face of the United States healthcare system, it has only grown in
importance since the passage of the Affordable Care Act.1 4 6
An additional milestone in the healthcare industry is the availability
of new technology and its rapid evolution.1 47 Healthcare providers are
now "becoming [increasingly] dependent on digital technologies to
improve patient-specialist communication, provide efficient clinical
treatments, improve the diagnosis of dangerous diseases, reduce public health threats, and optimize health services globally."1 48 New technologies will continue to change the traditional healthcare industry as
we know it. Not only will technological innovations affect the medical
services provided by optimizing diagnosis and treatment of disease
and improving delicate decision-making processes, it will also impact
the business aspects of medicine by allowing organizations to provide
tive

in Today's Healthcare Market, HIAI:rIIMANAGEMI:NT.ORG (Oct. 26, 2016), https://
healthmanagement.org/c/hospital/whitepaper/the-keys-to-staying-competitive-in-today-s-heathcare-market (last visited Jan 5, 2020).
141. See Reed Abelson & Julie Creswell, The DisappearingDoctor: How Mega-Mergers Are
Changing the Business of Medical Care, N.Y. TIMis (Apr. 7, 2018).
142. Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106, 114 (III. 1997); Hayes, supra
note 103.
143. Japsen, supra note 110; Bruce Japsen, Half Of Obamacare Choices Are HMOs Or Narrow Network Plans, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2016/01/
13/half-of-obamacare-choices-are-hmos-or-narrow-network-plans/?sh=7cdb99987561;
Three
ways the Affordable Care Act marketplaces have evolved for consumers, BIuiJCROSS
BLUESlHIEm (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.bcbs.com/the-health-of-america/articles/three-ways-af
fordable-care-act-marketplaces-have-evolved-consumers.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Gabriel Rodriguez Alvins, Technology and innovation: A healthcare revolution, DRIVING
INNOVATION
(May 30, 2017), https://drivinginnovation.ie.edu/technology-and-innovation-ahealthcare-revolution/.
148. Id.
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optimized patient services while at the same time, increasing profitability.149 Additionally, the emergence of technology in healthcare has
made it easier than ever for patients to shop for their healthcare, thus
making healthcare a consumer enterprise. 150 The fact that patients
shop for healthcare as a consumer product is proof of the shift toward
commercialization already. This shift directly contradicts the AMA's
fear that free-market influence would "debase" the profession.
As such, healthcare delivery has changed substantially since the
AMA first introduced the corporate practice of medicine doctrine.
The contemporary healthcare model is dominated by managed care,
such as HMOs, and their profit-seeking, competitive and cost-minimizing behavior. 15 1 This is directly contrary to the purposes of the enforcement of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine and weakens
the force of the public policy arguments behind the doctrine. Additionally, the emergence and expansion of technology in healthcare has
empowered consumers and increased competition among companies.
Therefore, it is clear that the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
must be reevaluated in light of these persistent changes in the modern
healthcare environment.
B.

The Weakened Strength of Public Policy Arguments in Favor of
the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine

The three primary public policy bases for the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine are: (1) commercial exploitation and lowering of
professional standards stemming from the overriding profit motive of
corporations, (2) the division of physician loyalty between patient and
profit, and (3) the control of medical judgment influenced by nonphysician corporate managers.1 52 If these are the policy grounds foundational to the doctrine, the continuation of the doctrine should be
dependent on whether those grounds still exist. However, the changes
in the healthcare industry and the exceptions to the doctrine diminish
the force of these public policy foundations.
1.

Commercialization and Physician Loyalty

A primary factor in the original quest to prevent the corporate practice of medicine was the concern that commercial exploitation would
149. Id.
150. Anna Essmann, How consumers are hacking healthcare to their advantage-and4 reasons

why it's working, BARKLEY US (May 23, 2019), https://www.barkleyus.com/2019/05/23/consumer
skacinghealthcaretotheiradvantage/.
151. Id.
152. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 14.
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result if corporations employed physicians. 153 With little public notice,
a concern for "good business" has moved to the heart of healthcare, a
sector once relatively insulated from the pursuit of profit that drives
the rest of the United States economy.1 54 The overwhelming shift toward managed care has tremendously commercialized the healthcare
industry despite the persistence of the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine. 155 It is difficult to deny that the healthcare arena is a competitive and commercialized one in today's climate. After all, the
United States ranks health systems in the same way that we rank colleges and universities.1 56 Over the past few decades, the number of
for-profit healthcare facilities, ranging from national hospital chains
(some affiliated with graduate medical education institutions) to urgent care clinics and dialysis centers, has grown at a rate similar to the
tech industry.1 57
A cause for concern for commercial exploitation is the fear that a
division of loyalty forms between the patient and profit when corporations employ physicians. All of these entities introduce the profit motive into the provision of healthcare and thus raise such concerns.
However, there is never a denouncement of the profit motive in the
practice of medicine by physicians in the entirety of expert writings
relating to Anglo-American medical ethics .158 Despite this openness
to profit, professional organized medicine in the United States has
shown a strong resistance to any implications of the commercialization
of medicine' 59-but just that has emerged. And while commercializa153. Rosoff, supra note 105.
154. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, How an industry shifted from protecting patients to seeking
profit, STAN. MED. (2017).
155. MIADLINEPLUS, supra note 9.

156. U.S. News Releases 30th Annual 2019-20 Best Hospitals Rankings, U.S. Nitws & wouwn
R HP. (July 30, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/info/blogs/press-room/articles/2019-07-30/us-newsreleases-30th-annual-2019-20-best-hospitals-rankings. U.S. News and World Report is the
"global authority in hospital rankings." The rankings provide "a multifaceted assessment on
nearly every hospital nationwide that is designed to assist patients and their doctors in making
informed decisions about where to seek care."; Best Hospitals Rankings, U.S. Nmews & Wosm.
Ri:p., https://health.usnews.com/best-hospitals (last visited Nov. 18, 2020). See also World's Best
Hospitals 2019, NE'wswi. 1K, https://www.newsweek.comlbest-hospitals-2019/united-states

(last

visited Nov. 18, 2020).
157. Alyssa Rege, 8 largest for-profit health systems in U.S., BECKIR's Hosp. Rmev. (Jan. 24,
2017). See generally David Blumenthal & Joel S. weissman, Selling Teaching Hospitals To Investor-Owned Hospital Chains: Three Case Studies, 19 HIAI.T

AFFAIRS 158, 166 (2000); H. Lee

Murphy, Dialysis centers are the health industry'sgrowth story, MODERN HESAIHIrCARE (July 11,
2018); Joseph Burns, The Urgent Care Surge, MANAG6ID CARE MAGAZINE (Apr. 30, 2019); Historical (Compounded Annual) Growth Rates by Sector, N.Y.U. Sri:IZN ScIm. Bus. (Jan. 2020).
158. Veatch, supra note 94.
159. Id.
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tion is uniformly frowned upon, profit making has been tolerated and
even viewed as an appropriate part of medical practice.160
The growth of managed care organizations is not slowing as the
number of people enrolling in them is steadily increasing. 161 Because
the HMOs that dominate managed care may directly employ physicians, 162 the reach of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine has
diminished. As a result, the concern for a physician's divided loyalty
between patient and profit has also been diminished in the transition
to managed care, decreasing the force of this public policy argument
in favor of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine.
2.

Control of Medical Decisions and Judgment

Another cited justification for the existence of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine is the potential for non-physician, corporate
managers to interfere with the medical decision-making of the physicians. 163 This seems to present the most serious concern that would
arise from the corporate practice of medicine and the strongest argument against it. Although the commercialization of healthcare and the
division of loyalty between patients and profits may signal a decline of
the doctor-patient relationship, interference with medical decisions
could present the most direct "threat" to a patient's health.
The control of medical decisions is a valid and admirable concern,
however, the health insurance industry by its very nature undermines
physician autonomy. Insurance companies tell physicians which treatments are covered, and which are not, instantly removing control of
their medical decisions. Managed care dominates the modern healthcare industry, signifying the acceptance of the risk of non-physician
control in order to gain the efficiency driven by for-profit managed
care. While it may seem like campaigners for the doctrine have buried
their heads in the sand, the acceptance of managed care has not occurred without controversy. 164 For example, in recent years, critics of
managed care and physician groups have argued that step therapy
protocols,1 65 which require patients to try and fail on certain treat160. NORTH CAROLINA

MEDICAL

BOARD, supra note 79. A physician practicing medicine in a

profit-making context has never been viewed as unacceptable.
161. Japsen, supra note 110.
162. Supra note 143.
163. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 14.
164. E.g., Arif Aziz & Marc Sonenshine, Step Therapy Reform Will Help Physicians Put Patients First, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (Nov. 6, 2017).

165. Step therapy (also known as the "fail first" requirement) is a managed care approach to
prescriptions to control costs. It requires patients to try one or more medications specified by the
insurance company, typically lower cost prescription, to treat a health condition. Patients must
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ments before they will grant access to other options, inappropriately
allows managed care policies that promote cost-cutting to control
treatment plans. 166 Profit-based policies undermining patient care is
clearly of concern if corporate medicine practices were to expand beyond managed care; the independent judgment of physicians is already influenced by corporate practices that have been in place since
the creation of health insurance. 167
Further, physicians are not businesspeople, and without aid, this
may create inefficiencies in their practice.1 68 The integration of MSOs
in professional corporate business models provide evidence that it is
possible for non-physician corporate managers to become involved in
a medical practice without compromising the physician's decisionmaking process.
The potential for non-physician control of medical decisions does
not lead to the conclusion that the doctrine should remain in place.
States have not prohibited the existence of HMOs and other managed
care organizations that give rise to the potential for non-physician
control of medical decisions, presumably because the efficiencies they
create outweigh the potential risk of non-physician control of medical
decisions. Thus, states tolerate the danger of non-physician control
posed by profit-based managed care corporations. Moreover, states
that allow physician professional entities to contract around corporate
practice barriers through MSOs brings to light the benefits and efficiencies in utilizing corporate managers, so long as they are not too
deeply entangled in the medicine. Given the continued need for efficiency in the healthcare industry,1 69 states should consider how the
potential dangers posed by non-physician control of medical decisionmaking are outweighed by the benefits of the corporate practice of
medicine.
then fail those prescriptions (i.e., not see results) before they are allowed to "step up" to another
medication that may be more expensive. What is Step Therapy?, STiPTIiERAPY.COM, https://
www.steptherapy.com/what-is-step-therapy/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2020).
166. Letter from American Medical Association to The Honorable Seema Verma, Administra-

tor, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, U.S. DiiP'T HLAI:Fll & Hum. SeRv. (Sept. 7,
2018), https://www.amwa-doc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/September-7-2018-Step-TherapySign-on-Letter.pdf.
167. The Health Maintenance Organization Act was passed in 1973 and expanded profitbased managed care. Appendix B. A Brief History of Managed Care, NAT'L COUNCI. ON DISABILITY, https://ncd.gov/policy/appendix-b-brief-history-managed-care (last visited Sept. 11, 2020).
168. Jennifer Perry et al., Most Doctors Have Little or No Management Training, and That's a
Problem, HARv. Bus. Ri v. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/12/most-doctors-have-little-orno-management-training-and-thats-a-problem.
169. This Article argues that there is a need for efficiency in the health care system beyond
the current American health care system. See also Irene Fraser et al., Improving Efficiency and
Value in Health Care, 43 HiAl:rI Suiv. REs. 1781 (2008).
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a.

The HMO Exception

The HMO structure incorporates many of the characteristics the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine was designed to eradicate.1 7 0
HMOs impose lay control over a physician's treatment decisions. Because of their payment structures, HMOs operate on a fixed
budget; 171 thus, there is a strong incentive for cost control. Therefore,
HMOs are incentivized to pressure physicians to deploy a cheaper
treatment plan despite the fact that another treatment might be superior, albeit more expensive. For example, a physician may find that a
patient requires in-home nursing and physical therapy to fully recover,
but the HMO will only cover one or the other, forcing physicians to
choose. The implementation of these "cost-reducing" tactics could potentially be more costly than if a physician were to initially choose a
more expensive option than trying and failing, and as technology progresses, this effect may be further intensified.
Further, legislation has enabled HMOs to solicit patients. 172 This
undermines the public policy reasoning for the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine as it directly counters the fear of the dangers the
free market imposes on the profession. The widespread use of managed care, particularly HMOs in the United States healthcare system,
is a federal health care policy statement in favor of a competitive, corporate-based market. When establishing HMOs, which permit solicitation, Congress1 7 3 did not seem to share the same concerns as the
AMA, which were based on the fear that the free market would debase the profession. Finally, inherent in the HMO structure is the risk
that physician loyalty is divided between profit for the employer and
the good of the patient. This risk is no less apparent in the HMO
structure than it would be if the practice of medicine were held by
other corporate structures.
b.

Continued Oversight through Ethical Standards Boards

In addition, a state abandoning its corporate practice ban does not
lose all protections against corporate interference with medical decisions. In the absence of a corporate practice ban, physicians would
170. Holden v. Rockford Memorial Hospital, 678 N.E.2d 342, 347 (I1. App. Ct. 1997) (noting
that "the health maintenance organization (HMO) structure embodies many of the characteristics the corporate-practice-of-medicine doctrine was contrived to eradicate.").
171. Health Insurance Plan Types and Definitions, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGIs. (May 2011), https:/
/www.ncsl.org/research/health/health-insurance-plan-types-and-definitions.aspx.
172. See Freiman, supra note 35, at 481-82.
173. Given HMOs success in California, where the health care structure originated, Congress
passed the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 to foster growth of HMOs in the
United States to alleviate the escalating cost of the American health care system.
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continue to be subject to professional ethical standards and state licensing statutes. Both of these requirements 174 would prevent physicians from yielding to decisions made by those not trained as
physicians that contravene their medical judgment. While it can be
argued that such protections are not as strong as a continued corporate practice ban, they do diminish the strength of the argument that
abolition of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine would give
corporate managers free reign to interfere with medical decisions in
order to maximize profits. Physicians who allow such interference to
the detriment of their patients would be subject to repercussions from
professional organizations such as the AMA and American Osteopathic Association, and possibly the revocation of their licenses by
state licensing authorities. 175

IV.

IMPACT

Increased free-market influence is what stands in the way of a more
efficient system of allocating capital. Changes in the healthcare industry 176 over the years have contributed to the obsolescence of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. We fail to recognize this is
already happening and it makes little sense that a doctrine, which is
being conveniently ignored, still exists. Competition has the ability to
make doctors and the medical industry stronger and can improve patient care, as shown by the continued annual ranking of hospitals and
healthcare systems in the United States.' 77 Furthermore, with the development of telemedicine and emerging technology, such as artificial
intelligence, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine will create
unnecessary hurdles17 8 that further hinder medical progress and
preparedness in public health crises. For innovation and efficiency to
continue, state courts and legislatures should abandon the corporate
174. Most states, such as Illinois, have a Medical Practice Act in place that specifies details
regarding medical licensure, such as medical education and fitness for licensure requirements,
and details relating to medical discipline, such as which actions may be taken and specific
grounds for discipline ranging from gross negligence to record keeping failures. What Is the Medical Practice Act and Why Is It Important?, Iii.. ST'. MFD. SOc. (2017), https://www.isms.org/
Resources/For._Physicians/MedicalPracticeAct/What_Is_MedPractice_Act/.
175. E.g., 225 1iL. COMP. SrAr. 60/7 (2014). See also Drew Carlson & James N. Thompson,
The Role of State Medical Boards, 7 AM. MI.D. Ass'N J. Erim-s 311 (2005).
176. Referring to the previous section on the Contemporary Health Care Environment and
Corporate Influence.
177. Best Hospitals by Specialty, National Rankings, U.S. Nrews & WORLD Rip., https://
health.usnews.com/best-hospitals/rankings (last visited Jan. 3, 2020). Each year, U.S. News rates
nearly 5,000 hospitals across the country on six specialties and nine procedures and conditions.
178. Gottlieb, supra note 118.
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practice of medicine prohibitions to reflect current views on the commercialization of medicine.
A.

Health Care Efficiency and Innovation

The abandonment of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
will promote competition as well as efficiency. Although the proliferation of managed care has slowed the increase in healthcare costs, 17 9
there may be limits to the cost efficiency that managed care can bring.
For example, corporate ownership of physician practices, through increased administrative efficiency and oversight, may be a source of
increased efficiency. 180
Allowing corporate investors to have greater access to investment
opportunities within the practice of medicine offers better resources
and better equipment, which would enable a more efficient, higher
quality healthcare system. Commercialization of medicine through
for-profit healthcare enterprises may produce benefits, as for-profits
would have greater and quicker access to capital at lower costs than
non-profits. It increases the capital for new physician practices by expanding physician access to a greater range of funding sources, such as
investors, in an increasingly capital-deficient enterprise. 181 This, in
turn, increases innovation and entrepreneurship. At a time when massive investments of capital are needed to keep up with cutting-edge
medicine, non-profits experience increased difficulty in attracting
funds. 182 With commercialization, however, for-profit enterprises can
attract investors by issuing stock, securing money needed to build and
renovate facilities, updating equipment, and investing in state-of-theart medical technology.' 83
If medical providers were able to compete and incentivize their
peers to do the same, we would see more regularly updated healthcare, as well as a furtherance of innovation and the application of new
179. Alex Spanko, Managed Care Programs Improve Care, Reduce Costs, HOME HEALTH
CARE NEws(May 17, 2017), https://homehealthcarenews.com/2017/05/survey-managed-care-pro
grams-improve-care-reduce-costs/.
180. Evolving Physician-PracticeOwnership Models, AM. HosP. AsS'N, https://www.aha.org/
system/files/media/file/2020/02/Market_InsightsMDOwnershipModels.pdf.
181. See Jonathan LaMantia, Physician practices increasingly turn to private equity for capital,
MOD. HEALTH CARE (Apr. 26, 2019, 12:11 P.M.), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/finance/
physician-practices-increasingly-turn-private-equity-capital.
182. "For-profit niche providers... are often better capitalized and able to share the risk with
physician-investors than is the case for community facilities." Molly Joel Coye & Jason Kell,
How Hospitals Confront New Technology, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 163, 166 (2006).
183. See John F. Horty & Daniel M. Mulholland III, Legal Differences Between InvestorOwned and Nonprofit Health Care Institutions, NEw HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT 17, 27-28
(1983).
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technology. 184 This is a natural result of competition in the marketplace. 185 Patients will receive significantly more treatment options
when competition is strong in the market.1 86 Further, businesses in
general tend to be more productive and efficient when there is competition in the market. 187 If the provider knows that their competitor is
making new strategies regularly, the provider would optimize its own
operations. This means that the patient would get better care, optimized treatment products, and at the same time, access to a management system that is listening to the patient. 188 This would be the
biggest advantage of market competition in the healthcare industry.
1.

The Effect on Telemedicine

The state-to-state inconsistencies seen with the corporate practice
of medicine may result in hurdles to the emerging field of

telemedicine. If a telemedicine provider is located in a state that does

'

not prohibit the corporate practice of medicine, then that provider
may be organized as a general business entity, and therefore, may employ physicians.1 89 However, for example, if that provider were to service a patient in California through a California-licensed employee,
the payment to the physician-employee could be held to violate the
state's ban on the corporate practice of medicine, as California is a
strong-form prohibition state.1 90 The doctrine complicates the provision of healthcare across state lines since state law and enforcement
vary dramatically, making interstate business alignment difficult and
hazardous.' 9
As mentioned earlier in this Article, it is possible that telemedicine
providers may mistakenly believe that to provide services across state
lines, they simply must make sure that they are appropriately licensed
184. Competition in the Health Care Marketplace, Feo. TRADE COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/
tips-advice/competition-guidance/industry-guidance/health-care.
185. See FTC Fact Sheet: How Competition Works, Fi!). TRADw COMM'N, https://
www.consumer.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/games/off-site/youarehere/pages/pdf/FTC-CompetitionHow-Comp-works.pdf.
186. See Top Challenges Number 3: Increased competition, MED. EcoN. (Dec. 27, 2019),
https://www.medicaleconomics.com/view/top-challenges-number-3-increased-competition.
187. FEDERAL. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 184.
188. See Martin Gaynor et al., Death by Market Power: Reform, Competition, and Patient
Outcomes in the National Health Service, 5 AM. EcON. J. 134, 163 (2013).
189. Carol Lucas, Lions and Tigers and Bears, Oh My! The Unexpected Laws that May Affect
Your Telehealth Business, BUcnAIIrER NI MER (2015), https://www.buchalter.com/publication/li
ons-and-tigers-and-bears-oh-my-the-unexpected-laws-that-may-affect-your-telehealth-business/.
190. Id.
191. See Kyle Faget, Direct-to-Patient Telemedicine Legal and Regulatory Considerations,
NRTRC REG'L TEL.[IALIII CONF. (Oct. 2, 2018).
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in the state in which the patients are located. 192 These providers overlook the fact that state corporate practice of medicine laws often presume that care is fixed in a single location and provided by an
individual or entity that meets that particular state's corporate practice of medicine requirements.' 9 3 In such cases, the very corporate
structure under which the telemedicine provider operates in one state
may disqualify it from entering a new state. Additionally, the complex
web of state laws that govern the provision of healthcare services may
194
force providers to undertake risk in the face of legal uncertainty.
Accordingly, the failure of the state medical boards and legislatures to
take a thoughtful and coordinated approach to governing the provision of telehealth services results in the partial or total loss of some of
the biggest benefits that telehealth has to offer. 195
If the corporate practice of medicine bans were lifted in states
across the country, telemedicine companies would not have to worry
about potential legal violations if they wish to expand their practice
across multiple states. Without these legal concerns, telemedicine
could proliferate and more patients could overcome barriers to health
services, such as physical distance between patient and provider and
availability of providers. 196 Eliminating the hurdles the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine posed to telemedicine would result in
increased access to care, especially for specialized providers. For example, a patient in one state may have a condition requiring the consultation of a specialist in another state across the country. If
telemedicine companies were able to proliferate without concerns of
corporate bans, more patients in this situation may have access to such
specialists. This increased access to this type of care may result in a
faster rate of treating certain conditions.
Additionally, given the current physician shortage issue the United
States is facing,1 97 increased access to care through the use of
telemedicine may help alleviate this problem. Currently, to address
the physician shortage problem, many states are creating new licensure types such as Graduate Physician and Assistant Physician, which
Lucas, supra note 189.
See generally, Id.
See generally Faget, supra note 191.
See N M Hjelm, Benefits and drawbacks of telemedicine, 11 J. TELEMEDICINE & TELECARE 60, 66 (2005); Shirley Svorny, Liberating Telemedicine: Options to Eliminate the State-Licensing Roadblock, CATO INST. (Nov. 15, 2017).
196. See N M Hjelm, supra note 195, at 65-66.
197. See Jeff Lagasse, With physician shortage looming, hospitals turn to telehealth tools,
HEALTHCARE FIN. (June 1, 2018), https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/physicianshortage-looming-hospitals-turn-telehealth-tools.
192.
193.
194.
195.
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allow medical school graduates who did not match into a residency
program to practice medicine under the limited supervision of a fully
licensed physician. 198 These licensure types often do not place a cap
on how long an un-matched 199 physician can practice without fully
completing their medical training.2 00 Having physicians who did not
complete their medical education in its entirety puts patients at risk.20
Allowing for telemedicine companies to easily expand their reach
without the constraints of the corporate ban would result in more patients being able to access safe healthcare from a fully licensed
professional.
2.

Response to pandemics: COVID-19

The purposeful state restrictions imposed by the corporate practice
of medicine prohibition are no secret to healthcare delivery systems.
But when global pandemics arise and local restrictions inhibit the deployment of needed medical services, these cross-border restrictions
are irrelevant. The United States failed to learn from the negative effects of such restrictions during the Spanish Flu pandemic of 1918202
or from the polio outbreak in the 1950s, 203 and when facing such issues during the COVID-19 2 04 pandemic of 2019-2020, the nation is
scrambling. 205
198. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 334.037 (2019); The Graduate Physician Act, S.B. 672 Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. 2019).
199. "The Match" program is a system where medical residency candidates and accredited
residency programs concurrently "match" to fill first- and second-year post-graduate training
positions. Securing one of these residency positions is vital because postgraduate residency training is one of the requirements to obtaining a state medical license and determines in which
specialization each physician will focus throughout their career. There is a possibility that a physician does not match into a residency program or are "un-matched." See The Match: Getting
Into a Residency Program, AM. ACAo. FAM. PIiYSICIANs, https://www.aafp.org/students-resi
dents/medical-students/become-a-resident/match.html#:-:text=the%20Match %20process%20is
%20a,Graduate%20Medical%20Education%20(ACGME);
How the Matching Algorithm
Works, NAT'L RFSIDENr MATCING PROGRAM, https://www.nrmp.org/matching-algorithm/ (last

visited Dec. 24, 2020).
200. See § 334.037. The language of the Missouri law and the proposed Graduate Physician
Act of Tennessee do not place a cap on how long an Assistant Physician or a Graduate Physician
may practice before fully completing medical school.
201. See Bradley D. Freeman, The Implications of Missouri's First-in-the-Nation Assistant
Physician Legislation, 8 J. GRADUATE Mi".D. EDUC. 24 (2016).
202. See generally CHARlES Riv;R, Tim 1918 SPANISH FLu PANDnMIC: Tilm HISTORY AND
LEGACY OF TI'
WORL.D's DEADLIEST INFILUEN.A OUTnRAK (2017).
203. See generally DAVID M. OSIIINSKY, POLIO: AN AMERICAN STORY (2005).
204. Also referred to as the "coronavirus."
205. Anthony Zurcher, Coronavirus: Things the US has got wrong - and got right, BBC Ni=ws
(Apr. 1, 2020).
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The Centers for Disease Control has recommended the use of
telehealth to help address preparedness.206 With COVID-19's continued transmission, the use of virtual visits has climbed as it is a way to
safely treat patients and contain the spread of the virus at hospitals,
clinics, and medical offices. 207 As world governments have continued
social distancing measures to contain the virus, 208 the use of
telemedicine services will likely explode. Numerous states across the
nation have already enacted emergency legislation to remove licensure and practice barriers to expand the reach of physicians to patients. 209 But many of these emergency laws have expiration dates, 210
which is counterintuitive. As history has shown us, another outbreak
will happen, and we need to be prepared. Reinstating these restrictions put us back at square one. These restrictions need to be lifted
and remain that way.
However, it is not just telemedicine and licensure restrictions holding back the efficient deployment of medicine in times of need, it's the
need for a doctor and resources in general. If the corporate ban were
universally lifted, healthcare could more easily expand and providers
could perform a number of services 21 1 without requiring a patient to
2 2
visit a crowded medical center and risk spreading the disease. 1 Typically, providers must be licensed in the state in which the patient is
located, however, several states have exceptions that providers could
leverage in response to the virus. 213 But these exceptions do not take
the inconsistencies of the corporate ban into account, which may create further barriers to providing care. With the corporate ban lifted in
the United States, telehealth care, and medical care in general, the
response to COVID-19 could efficiently expand further.

206. Using Telehealth to Expand Access to Essential Health Services during the COVID-19
Pandemic Using Telehealth Services, CDC (June 10, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019
-ncov/hcp/telehealth.html.
207. Reed Abelson, Doctors and Patients Turn to Telemedicine in the Coronavirus Outbreak,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/health/telemedicine-coronavi
rus.html.
208. Jessie Yeung, How countries around the world are responding to the coronavirus out-

break, CNN (March 5, 2020, 1:02 A.M.), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/04/asia/coronavirus-coun
tries-response-intl-hnk/index.html.
209. E.g., An Act to Promote Telehealth, L.D. 1974 Reg. Sess. (Maine 2020).
210. Id.
211. However, a telehealth physician cannot diagnose COVID-19 through a telehealth visit.
212. Lisa Schmitz Mazur et al., The Role Of Telehealth In COVID-19 Response Efforts, 10
NAT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2020).
213. Id.

186

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
B.

[Vol. 70:157

A Lower Cost of Care

Modifying the corporate practice of medicine doctrine and abandoning its antiquated public policy concerns would ultimately lower
the costs of care. The amount the United States spends on healthcare
every year has grown from approximately $75 billion in 1970214 and is
projected to reach nearly $6 trillion by 2027.215 Commercialization of
healthcare is one solution for controlling the soaring costs and overutilization of health services. Corporate efficiency and the discipline
that accompanies the drive to maximize profits can cure a system afflicted by inefficiency and waste.
As the number of for-profit healthcare facilities increase, we can
expect to see an end to such gross inefficiency. The entrepreneurial
spirit will give rise to innovation in the delivery and management of
services, leading to more efficient methods of production and treatment. Most products and services in the United States are bought and
sold in some form of a marketplace, in which consumers possess relevant buying information, which forces sellers to provide high-quality
products at competitive prices to earn and retain the consumer. 216
A glimmer of the potential of competition dynamics in the healthcare marketplace has been seen with the explosion of urgent care clinics. 2 1 7 These facilities have proven that as patients are struggling with
the escalating cost of emergency care, they are searching for lower
cost and more convenient care. 2 18 As private equity investors become
involved with providing advanced facilities, hospitals fear a loss of patients, and in turn a loss of revenue. 219 However, these competitive
dynamics where some sellers will win loyal customers (in this case,
patients) and others will lose is simply not present in the United States
healthcare delivery system to the extent it could be due to the varying
restraints of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Because of
214. Rabah Kamal et al., How has U.S. spending on healthcare changed over time?, PETERSON
HEALTHCIARE & KAIseiz FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.healthsystemtrack

Crii.

er.org/chart-collection/u-s-spending-healthcare-changed-time/#item-start.
215. National Health Expenditure Projections 2018-2027, Forecast Summary, CMS, https://

www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Nationa
HealthExpendData/Downloads/ForecastSummary.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2019). "Under current law, national health spending is projected to grow at an average of 5.5 percent per year for
2018-27 and reach nearly $6.0 trillion by 2027." Id.
216. Competition Counts: How Consumers Win When Businesses Compete, F;D. TRADI:
COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/competition-counts/zgen0l.pdf.
217. See generally Shelagh Dolan, How the growth of the urgent care industry business model is
changing the healthcare market, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/
urgent-care-industry-trends.
218. Joseph Burns, The Urgent Care Surge, 28 MANAGED CARE 38, 39 (Apr. 30, 2019).
219. Id.
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an absence of transparent competition due to the doctrine, doctors
who outperform on both cost and quality still cannot effectively attract and keep patients better than the doctors who underperform.
Moreover, a report on employer health benefits from the Kaiser
Family Foundation found that in 2019, the average family premium
rose 5% and the average individual premium rose 4% over the past
year, and "the average annual premiums for employer-sponsored
health insurance were $7,188 for single coverage and $20,567 for family coverage." 220 Additionally, it was found that over the past five and
ten years, the average premiums for a family have increased 22% and
54%, respectively, which is significantly more than either workers'
wages or inflation. 221 With these high costs, it is no surprise that employees are displeased. At the same time, 53% of employers shopped
for a new health plan or insurance carrier in 2019,222 suggesting that
companies know there is more they can do to help their employees get
better care at lower costs. However, businesses often lack a clear understanding of what exactly their dollars are getting them when choosing a health plan to offer their employees. Despite the increasing cost
of employer-sponsored health insurance, business owners and benefit
decision makers generally have very little useful buying information
on health benefits. 223
Unfortunately, this status quo has continued-one that does not let
physicians and other medical care providers who demonstrate clinical
and economic quality incentivize others to do the same. If providers
were able to do this, the competition in the healthcare marketplace
would ensure that a provider could focus on their patients. More patients would mean more market share, and in turn, more safety for the
physician. However, if the provider group were to start losing its market share, then their competitor-providers would have an advantaged
position. On the other hand, where there is no competition, then the
providers and insurers are not worried. Being worried is necessary to
220. 2019 Employer Health Benefits Survey, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 25, 2019), https://
www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2016-employer-health-benefits-survey/.
221. Id.
222. 2019 Employer Health Benefits Survey, Section 14: Employer Practices and Health Plan
Networks, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2019section-14-employer-practices-and-health-plan-networks/.
223. Average Annual Single Premium per Enrolled Employee For Employer-Based Health Insurance, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2018), kff.org/other/state-indicator/single-coverage/?currentTimeframe=1&sortModel=%7B"colld":"Location","sort":"asc"%7D; Marian R. Mulkey & Jill
M. Yegian, Small Businesses, Information, And The Decision To Offer Health Insurance,
HEALTH AFFAIRS (2001); Stephen Miller, Employers Project Health Plan Costs Will Rise 5.3%
for 2021, Soc'y Hum. REs. MGm-r. (Aug. 21, 2020) https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/hrtopics/benefits/pages/employers-project-health-plan-cost-rise-for-2021.aspx.
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incentivize healthcare providers and insurers to provide patients with
the best care possible.
C.

The Future of the Doctrine and Social Responsibility Concerns

Critics of for-profit healthcare delivery systems with free market influence profess that these facilities' bottom line is the dollar, so they
find ways to avoid caring for patients in a time of need. However,
even non-profit health systems have been known to make moneydriven decisions and are among the most profitable in the nation.224
Nevertheless, with a lift of the corporate practice ban, there is no
question that some for-profit healthcare companies may overlook patient needs and do what businesses do: i.e., generate revenue. Therefore, there is a definite need for oversight of the corporate practice of
medicine to avoid egregious abuse of corporate power in healthcare.
The best course of action for healthcare in the United States would
be to completely abolish the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
from states and replace it with limited corporate oversight on the federal level to protect society from abuse of the system. Creating a uniform Act applied across all states would be an ideal path to fulfill the
United States' needs, permitting the corporate practice of medicine
while, at the same time, keeping social responsibility concerns in
mind. This Act would also eliminate the doctrine's strictness that suppresses cost-savings, innovation, and modernization while at the same
time preserving some of the doctrine's original patient protections.
Such protections could be maintained by a minimum requirement of
physician shareholders or members or a requirement of regular physician consultation to the board of directors. The Act would additionally provide guidance to managed care, such as HMOs, as well as the
use of MSOs in PCs and PLLCs, making our healthcare environment
even more efficient. Furthermore, having a uniform law in the United
States would make it easier for healthcare organizations, such as
telehealth, to expand without the worry of state-by-state hurdles.
Additionally, for-profits, unlike non-profits, pay taxes and in doing
so, the corporations can pay their share in serving those in need
through tax-supported public programs. This tax could be increased in
a way to account for social responsibility concerns (for example, treat224. E.g., Jeremy Berke, A prestigious NYC hospital tried to fire 30 doctors and exposed a
huge problem with healthcare in America, Bus. INSIURR (Oct. 23, 2015, 1:21 A.M.), https://
See also
www.businessinsider.com.aulamerica-has-a-shortage-of-primary-care-doctors-2015-10.
Martha C. white, Hospitals made $21B on Wall Street last year, but are patients seeing those
profits?, NBC Bus. Nrws (Feb. 7, 2018, 11:59 A.M.), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/busi
ness-news/hospitals-made-21 b-wall-street-last-year-are-patients-seeing-n845176.

2020]CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE DOCTRINE 189
ing the indigent). However, it could be argued that to impose on owners of for-profits a social obligation over and above an obligation to
pay taxes is to impose an obligation on them that is not imposed on
owners of other businesses. While this may be the case, it could be
possible to carve out a separate consideration for those providing
healthcare in order to encourage treatment for the less fortunate.

V.

CONCLUSION

The continued evolution of the healthcare industry since the inception of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine has diminished the

public policy grounds that provide the only support for the judicial
continuation of the doctrine, given the absence in most states of explicit statutory language. The risk of commercial exploitation, divided
physician loyalty between patient and profit, and non-physician control of medical decisions is (and has been for decades) tolerated in
order to achieve the efficiencies of managed care, while mechanisms
for quality assessments help to ensure that HMOs and other entities
do not sacrifice quality for increased profits. In addition, the benefit of
assuming these risks in exchange for more efficient healthcare services
is further illustrated by exceptions that have been carved out of the
corporate practice ban.
The AMA wants to create some form of a physician's union, which
is admirable. But, the deployment of medicine across the nation in
times of need, such as pandemics, is incredibly difficult as each state
acts deliberately to make it impossible with this doctrine. Again, the
policy grounds for the doctrine shatter, as no one can argue it is not in
the best interest of the patient to make the deployment of medicine
and medical resources more cost effective and efficient.
Although the reach of the corporate practice of medicine has been
limited by managed care and other exceptions, such as the use of
MSOs to circumvent the ban, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine may still achieve its public policy goals in the private practice
sector, however, this has been decreasing. 225 But the doctrine's continued application has negative effects. With healthcare costs consistently
increasing, there is a need for continued efficiency gains as these costs
have increased twice as fast as employee earnings, despite the ad225. Meera Jagannathan & Quentin Fottrell, For the first time, physicians are less likely to
operate their own practices, MARKFTWATCH

(May 8, 2019, 9:10 A.M.), https://www.market

watch.com/story/for-the-first-time-physicians-are-less-likely-to-operate-their-own-practices2019-05-08.
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vances made by managed care in controlling healthcare costs. 2 2 6 These
negative effects of the strong-form, or even weak-form, corporate
practice of medicine doctrine as it exists today strongly outweigh the
diminished public policy justifications for a continued ban. States
should revoke any existing corporate practice of medicine doctrine
and explicitly allow corporations to employ physicians to practice
medicine. This "commercialization" should be limited to some extent;
however, this needed oversight could be achieved through a federal
act, ridding the nation of vast inconsistencies. At the same time, states
can maintain the ability to intervene with the non-physician, corporate
manager if they were to intervene with the physician's medical judgment as well as their ethical standards boards. With this method, not
all control would be lost with healthcare if the ban were lifted.
It cannot be denied that commercialization is required for better
facilities and technology. But profit and social responsibility do not
need to be mutually exclusive in healthcare when we merge them
thoughtfully. This must be kept in mind as the United States works to
transform its healthcare market. If the ban were in fact to be lifted,
the United States' healthcare industry may be catapulted into a more
contemporary healthcare environment, prepared for any pandemic to
come.
Kathrine Marous

226. Alison Rodriguez, Healthcare Costs Increased Twice as Fast as Worker Wages Over the
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